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August 11, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
 FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
 SAMUEL M. HOSKINSON
 SUBJECT: Support for the Jordan Army

An issue is on the near horizon with regard to our assistance for Jordan which we need to discuss in a preliminary way. You may recall that Hussein in a message to you earlier in the summer noted that recent war games had indicated a gap in one area of his defenses and that he would need additional forces and equipment to fill this.

[redacted] he has decided to form a new armored division. Part of this would come from the consolidation of two existing brigades and the incorporation of some National Guard personnel, but one new brigade would be developed. Most significant for our discussion is the fact that these reports indicate that this decision will necessitate increasing the manpower level in the Jordan army from the 64,500 officers and men in the current force to almost 75,000 by December 1975.

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The issue is not whether the forces are needed. The problem is that the increase to 75,000 men is expected to add some \$10 million to Jordan Army costs, and these are the costs which we have been called on to fund.

Over the years, the Jordanian force level has been the subject of discussion between our governments because it affects the level of our budget support. For instance, in June and July 1971 during the economic discussions between our governments, the Jordanians indicated that their operating manning level was about 65,000 and they agreed that this would remain the basis for our assistance at this time and that they would eventually bring the number down to about 56,000. This was the basis for the budget support that we have provided so far and for the three-year \$120 million military assistance package for equipment.

NSC review completed.

State Dept. review completed

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What we have here is not so much a political issue -- everyone wants to do what we can to support Jordan -- but a question of how we make the most of the resources which we have to support Jordan. We are currently stretching our supporting assistance funds to provide the \$20 million more in budget support that we recommended in connection with the King's last visit here. You will recall that these funds had to be drawn from funds initially programmed for Southeast Asia. It will not be easy to go much beyond that, especially since Congress is cutting our requests again this year.

These are two broad choices:

1. Remain silent. We could let the King move ahead and incur these extra costs on the assumption that additional US money would be provided.

If we were to take this course we in effect would foreclose our options. We would be committing ourselves by tacit agreement. We, of course, could make a strong case with Congress in support of increased funds for Jordan next year, given Hussein's increased defense needs if he moves down the track toward separate peace with Israel. We would request a supporting assistance level of \$60-70 million rather than the \$50 million we are now asking. But the problem is not in requesting funds and justifying the request -- it is in allocating the total which Congress finally makes available. Substantial overall Congressional cuts in our requests would simply mean that to support Jordan at a higher level we would have to bite into other programs (primarily Southeast Asia) even deeper than we did this year.

2. Approach Hussein. The other course is to raise with him tactfully now the financial problems that an increase in his force level would present. At the staff level, there have been repeated reviews between US and Jordanian officials on Jordanian budget levels since they are the basis for Jordanian requests to us, and this approach would grow out of those. We would simply explain that we want to be as helpful as possible as the increase in budget assistance in the past two years demonstrates. But we cannot now be sure that Congress will make available sufficient funds to enable us to make a further increase which the added troop

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strength might imply. We will do everything we can but we want him to know of the possible constraints on our help for his own planning.

This approach would be fair to Hussein in cautioning against assumptions in his planning of an aid level we might not be able to meet. At the same time it would leave open our own options to make the policy decision on the total aid level when we know more about his needs and our own resource availabilities.

No action will be taken as a result of this memo. Its purpose is to get your preliminary thoughts only. We may be faced with a State proposal shortly, and I would like to be in a position to shape it.

Recommendation: That we be prepared to approach the Jordanians as tactfully as possible along the lines of course 2 above.

Approve HK

The alternative is to plan on a higher level of Supporting Assistance for Jordan, acknowledging that Congressional appropriations remain uncertain.

Approve _____

Concurrence: Richard T. Kennedy RTK

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